Laziness of which a man is conscious;

and

laziness of which he is unconscious, are a thousand miles apart. Unconscious laziness is real laziness; conscious laziness is not complete laziness, because there is still some clarity in it. 

Distraction comes from letting the spirit

wander about; laziness comes from the spirit not yet being pure. Distraction is much easier to correct than laziness.

It is as in sickness : if one feels pains and itchings, one can help them with remedies, but laziness is like a disease that is attended by loss of feeling. 

Distraction can be overcome, confusion can be straightened out,.but laziness and absent-mindedness are heavy and dark.

Distraction and confusion at least have a place, but in laziness and absent-mindedness the anima alone is active.In inattention the animus is still present, but in laziness pure darkness rules.

Nietzsche on the Practice of Genuine Concern for Others Friederich Nietzsche's popular reputation as positing an aristocratic division between individuals, in which the spiritually evolved "philosophers of the future" have no traffic with any but their own kind, and even evince a certain disdain for the "human herd" beneath them, is not entirely accurate. Not that Nietzsche could agree to the elimination of what he called "ranks" of individuals, which he saw as foolishly opposing nature, hence not even possible, and, more centrally, as ultimately devaluing and undermining the potential contributions of the truly superior few "unfettered spirits". Hence, for example, he cannot accept Marxism in any manner acceptable to a Marxist: for Nietzsche, there are and always will be worthier and grander individuals - this is decreed by fate itself, he feels. However, that said, Nietzsche believes that the more fully developed "superior" individual is quite naturally ready to assist others in a humble manner, minus any interest in parading a stance of superiority or of promoting one's ego. His (and today we also say "her") understanding of the more profound and genuine understanding of the world is, where appropriate, a gift to be shared to others. Hence, in "Dawn: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality" (1881) he writes..."Ah! How it nauseates me to impose my thoughts on another! How I take pleasure in every mood and secret conversation within myself by which the thoughts of others prevail over my own! From time to time there occurs an even higher celebration, when for a change one is allowed to give away one's spiritual house and possessions like the father confessor who sits in the corner, eager for one in need to come and recount the travail of his thoughts in order that he, the father confessor, might once again fill his hand and heart and lighten his burdened soul." (Dawn 449) Of course, in the foregoing we do not find evidence of anything like an interchange between equals: the "father confessor" remains separated from the burdened one by virtue of their existing in different psycho-spiritual classes of humans. However, I think it's also clear that Nietzsche sees the enlightened individual as beyond crude egoism and the need for power, and so as finding pleasure in giving of himself (and herself) to others. In all this, Nietzsche adamantly rejects the idea that such care for others can genuinely exist in the standard qualities of "altruism", "empathy" or "compassion". He sees these taken-for-granted definitions of being-for-others as actually undermining the capacity to express genuine understanding of another's world, given that, among other things, they are emotional qualities that are often disguised expressions of self-promoting narcissism and, more importantly, detract from the superior individual's need to cultivate, not socially normative moral "goodness", aimed as it is at preserving a recognizable social order more than honestly and courageously confronting life's suffering,, but the more substantial quality of "integrity". Hence, to be "kind" and "helpful" is, For Nietzsche, as often as not to be, unconsciously, anything but. About the foregoing quote from Dawn, Keith Ansell-Pearson (2015) says, "One (the "superior individual") constructs one's domain, but in a way that is not self-centered, but in fact self-renouncing." And important to grasp is that this form of self-displacement in the service of others is the paradoxical product of the spiritual aristocrat's work at, and satisfaction in developing his (or her) own special powers and rare abilities, whatever they may be, as given by nature or fate. Hence, concludes Ansell-Pearson about the above-quoted passage in Dawn "(here) he is clearly hinting at a special mode of care of others, and one that is not at all free of self-interest and self-enjoyment". (p. 63) Nietzsche's concept of concern-for-the other is highly unconventional and possibly unrecognizable to most of us, raised as we are to believe that there can be no spiritually elevated form of self-interest; that to lay claim a certain superiority of intellectual or affective rank is to somehow diminish others (this being an expression of an interpersonal "leveling" impulse aimed at suppressing envy between people); and to generally feel uncomfortable with recognizing and honoring the gifts that nature has bestowed on us (and which we perhaps can eventually apply to minister to others). Rather, Nietzsche insists that these naturally worthy qualities should be celebrated and carefully developed, that they are signs of a natural, "healthy" narcissism, and that it is merely a social prejudice that encourages us to deny their inestimable value. References: Ansell-Pearson, Keith (2015). "Beyond Selfishness: Epicurean Ethics in in Nietzsche and Guyau", in "Nietzsche's Free Spirit Philosophy", pp. 49-69. Bamford, Rebecca, Ed.. Rowman & Littlefield. Dawn: Thoughts On The Presumptions Of Morality (1881/2011). Stanford University Press. Illustration - Lucian Freud, Portrait (date unk.)